Israel has repeatedly warned the international community it will not tolerate a nuclear-capable Iran led by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who infamously insisted that the Jewish state "be wiped off the map."
Benjamin Netanyahu, a leading candidate for prime minister, recently opined that Iran posed the "greatest danger" to Israel and pledged to thwart its nuclear aspirations.
When asked if halting the Islamic Republic's nuclear programme implied a military strike, Netanyahu replied: "it includes everything that is necessary to make this statement come true."
Similar sentiments were expressed by Israel Air Force (IAF) commander Maj Gen Ido Nehushtan, who told Der Spiegel the IDF (Israel Defence Forces) was prepared to stop Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.
"If I understand it correctly, all options are on the table. The Air Force is a very robust and flexible force. We are ready to do whatever is demanded of us," Nehushtan said.
Iran, however, continues to dismiss Israel's warnings as crude "psychological" warfare.
"The global and regional situation and especially the confusion inside the Zionist regime (of Israel) itself do not give military strikes any serious ground. This is just a form of psychological war," claimed Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hassan Qashqavi Qashqavi.
Nathan Hughes, an analyst at a Texas-based global intelligence company known as Stratfor, offered The News his analysis of a possible Israeli strike.
"The IAF simply does not have the capacity to hit every nuclear program target in Iran, even if they were less dispersed," Hughes explained. "Israel necessarily must exercise discretion and will focus on the most high-value sites it knows it has a high chance of destroying. The goal would not be to completely destroy the programme, but to meaningfully set it back, as with the US Desert Fox strikes on Iraq in 1998."
The military analyst also commented on rumors that Iran may have received advanced Russian-manufactured S-300 air defence units.
"It is not at all clear that Iran has actually taken delivery of the S-300, but hypothetically it would greatly complicate the air defence picture," said Hughes. "The immense range of the S-300 is particularly problematic, because it makes it far more difficult to skirt around or otherwise avoid its areas of coverage to hit more vulnerable targets. The consequence would be a vastly expanded need for aircraft equipped for the suppression of enemy air defences and expanded preparations for combat search and rescue for downed pilots. Given the limits of the IAF operating at this range, these increased requirements for SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) and CSAR (Combat Search and Rescue) would meaningfully reduce the IAF's capacity to deliver munitions on actual nuclear programme targets," Hughes added.
Yet, the Jewish state is unlikely to deploy modified Jericho-II or Jericho-III missiles against Iranian nuclear facilities.
"Israel would be extremely hesitant to employ the longest-range element of its nuclear triad in a strike for which it would want to retain the maximum flexibility in its retaliatory capability - and the longer-range Jerichos would be the tool of choice for holding Tehran at risk," assessed Hughes. "Given that the strike could not be carried out solely with Jerichos and aircraft would be required anyway, the benefits of supplementing those airstrikes with Jerichos would be limited - especially since the effectiveness of their accuracy (though unknown) combined with the conventional warhead on potential targets is questionable."
Israel's Dolphin submarines are also expected to refrain from participating in the operation.
"Putting them (the subs) at risk for more than ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) where they can remain hidden is questionable. Again, some conventional cruise missiles could hypothetically contribute to the airstrikes, but cannot achieve the objectives on their own and the potential contribution of one or even two subs would probably be marginal," Hughes concluded.
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